Since alternative forms of compensation have different incentive and risk attributes and may respond differently to observable firm performance measures, analysis of relations between executive pay and performance must consider the interplay between the components of total compensation. In this study, interrelations between compensation components and contemporaneous firm performance measures are considered in an empirical model that relates total compensation to performance through the cash bonus and stock-based shares of total compensation. For this analysis, total compensation and the stock-based share are measured using the ex ante or grant-date value of stock options and restricted stock. The model is specified in a manner that permits substitution across types of pay, relaxes restrictive assumptions about the time-series relations between compensation and performance, and accommodates reciprocal relations between pay and performance.
Introduction
In the organization of a public company, control rights are vested with the Directors who authorize the exercise of control rights by the chief executive officer and other top executive officers.
The Board of Directors develops a compensation policy that enables the firm to attract, retain and motivate the CEO and other top executives through negotiated compensation agreements. Agency theory provides important insights about the role of compensation in selecting and motivating top executives by describing compensation agreements that relate pay to observable performance. The economic agency models are generic in the sense that they describe the properties of compensation agreements and performance measures without distinguishing between specific types of pay or performance measurement systems. Empirical accounting research, which has a particular interest in the stewardship role of accounting information, has investigated the roles of market and accounting performance measures in executive compensation agreements. This research has, for the most part, not distinguished between specific types of compensation, nor has it considered interrelations between different types of compensation and alternative performance measures. In this study, we consider interrelations between cash and stock-based compensation and market and accounting based performance measures.
While the agency theoretic models relate total pay to performance, empirical research investigating relations between executives' compensation and their firms' market and accounting performance has focused on the cash components of total compensation. Inferences about the relations between total compensation and performance could be drawn from this earlier research because cash compensation dominated other forms of compensation during the periods studied. In recent years, the stock-based share of total compensation has increased significantly and now makes up about one-third of executives' total compensation. 1 1 We define total compensation to be the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive plan pay-outs, the Black-Scholes ex-ante value of options granted, the value of restricted stock granted (measured at the market value of the stock on the grant date), and other components (other annual and all other) as defined in the SEC disclosure requirements for 1992 and later years. Delayed components of compensation, such as pension benefits earned, are not included. For
With the increased emphasis on stock-based pay, critics of top executive compensation are now questioning how stock-based awards are determined and whether there are sufficiently strong relationships between executives' stock-based awards and firm performance. For example, Kahn (1997) reports, "The use of options has undergone spiraling inflation in the past half-dozen years, seriously diluting existing shareholdings and leading institutional investors to rethink the equity compensation strategy… According to consultant Pearl Meyer & Partners, the 200 largest US companies by market capitalization reserved nearly 12% of outstanding shares for management and employee equity incentives in 1996. That was up from 10.96% in 1995, and an amazing 71% increase since the 1989 proxy season when corporate America allocated less than 7% of shares for employees."
Within the agency framework, total pay is related to observable outputs through its variable components. Compensation agreements with executives may be structured and administered so that components of total pay, such as cash bonus and stock-based awards, respond differently to observable performance measures, such as market and accounting returns. Also, in the design of executive compensation contracts, different types of pay may be substituted for each other. To investigate interrelations between the pay components and performance measures, we estimate an empirical model that relates total compensation to firm performance through the cash bonus and stock-based shares of total pay. In our analysis, the stock-based share is defined to include the ex ante or grant-date value of stock option and restricted stock awards. We use the estimation results to examine how the cash bonus and stock-based shares of total compensation vary with market and accounting returns. Since, relative to cash pay, stock-based awards have continuing incentive properties and expose executives to continuing risk, we test for substitution between cash bonus pay and stock-based awards and investigate whether firms pay a premium to substitute stock-based awards for cash bonus pay. With respect to the premise that stock-based awards have continuing incentive value, we investigate whether executives' holdings of stock and options affect the level and mix of total compensation. the firms included in Standard and Poors' ExecuComp data, the mean value of cash compensation (salary, bonus and An empirical specification used in previous executive compensation research regresses the change in compensation between periods on the level of the firm's current stock return and the change in the firm's accounting return. Implicit in this specification are assumptions that compensation changes associated with performance shocks are permanent and that the expected accounting return for the current period equals the actual accounting return for the previous period (the accounting return series is treated as a random walk in compensation contracting). These assumptions may place untenable restrictions on the analysis if the compensation response to a performance shock is not permanent and the accounting return series is not treated as a random walk. The restrictions may be relaxed by using more general specifications that include the first-difference specifications as special cases. This involves using the current levels of the compensation and accounting returns as the primary dependent and independent variables and including their lagged values as separate independent variables. In our analysis, we employ the more general specifications and test whether or not the restrictions are valid.
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Most empirical investigations of executive compensation consider one-way relations between pay and performance. However, the theoretical agency models describe reciprocal relations between pay and performance -the variability of pay with performance in the agent's compensation contract affects performance and performance affects the observed level and mix of pay. We specify our model in a manner that accommodates two-way relations between pay and performance and investigate whether market and accounting performance are affected by the cash bonus and stock-based shares of total pay and by the executives' stock and option holdings.
Due to enhanced disclosure requirements for proxy statements filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission after December 31, 1992, information about the components of executives' total compensation is available for 1992 and later years that was not available or was difficult to extract for long-term incentive plan pay-outs) as a percentage of total compensation was about 72% in 1992 and 64% in 1996. 2 If compensation changes related to performance shocks are permanent, the coefficient on the lagged compensation variable should equal one. If the accounting return series is treated as a random walk in the evaluation of executive performance, the coefficients on the current and lagged values of accounting return should be of equal magnitude and opposite sign. earlier years. This information is now easily accessible for the top five executives at companies included in Standard and Poors' ExecuComp data. We estimate our model using the ExecuComp data for 1992 through 1997. Results of estimating the model indicate that both the cash bonus share and the stockbased share of executives' total compensation vary positively with market and accounting returns. We observe that market returns have a much greater influence (relative to accounting returns) on the stockbased share than on the cash bonus share, suggesting that companies reward current stock price performance with stock-based pay.
Using four-digit industry market and accounting returns, we find that market performance is evaluated relative to contemporaneous industry stock returns and that accounting performance is evaluated relative to previous firm and industry performance. With regard to interrelations between types of pay, we find that cash bonus payments and stock-based awards are substituted for each other and that executives are paid a premium to substitute stock-based pay for cash. We also find that the cash bonus share and the stock-based share of total pay decrease with the stock and option holdings of the executives. With respect to the time-series relations between pay and performance, we find that changes in pay related to performance shocks are not permanent and that, in the evaluation of performance for executive compensation purposes, the accounting return series is not treated as a random walk.
In accordance with the agency models, we find reciprocal relations between pay and performance. Simultaneous to the positive effects of market and accounting returns on the compensation variables, both market and accounting returns increase with the cash bonus share and the stock-based share of total pay. Consistent with stock and option awards having continuing incentive value, market returns also increase with the executives' stock and option holdings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review previous studies that examine relations between executive compensation and market and accounting performance measures, identify complexities that affect the empirical specification of compensation-performance relationships, and develop our hypotheses. In section 3, we describe our empirical model, and in section 4, we describe the data. In section 5, we present the results of estimation of our empirical model and compare the results with estimations obtained from other models. In section 6, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of this research.
Development of hypotheses
Accounting researchers are interested in the information properties of market and accounting performance measures in the context of executive performance evaluation. Empirical research has investigated how the sensitivity and precision of the performance measures (Banker and Datar 1989) influences the relative weights placed on market and accounting returns (Lambert and Larcker 1987, Sloan 1993) , how investment opportunities and other firm characteristics (Smith and Watts 1992) influence the relative weights placed on market and accounting returns (Ely 1991 , Clinch 1991 , Gaver and Gaver 1996 , Baber, Janakiraman and Kang 1996 , whether the relative influence of accounting returns has changed over time (Bushman, Engel, Milliron, and Smith 1998a) , how the properties of reported earnings affect pay-performance sensitivities (Bushman, Engel, Milliron and Smith 1998b) , and whether relative performance evaluation (Holmström 1982 ) is used to remove noise in the performance measures (Antle and Smith 1986 , Gibbons and Murphy 1990 , Janakiraman, Lambert and Larcker 1992 .
In many of these studies, changes in cash compensation are regressed on market returns and changes in accounting returns. While Lambert and Larcker estimated coefficients on the performance variables separately for each firm assuming stationarity over time, Ely, Sloan, Baber et al., and Bushman et al. estimated their models across a cross-section of firms. Researchers have consistently found that accounting returns have significant incremental explanatory power to market returns in estimations that relate cash compensation to performance. Lambert and Larcker and Sloan found that the relative weight placed on accounting returns increases with the relative noise in market returns. Baber et al. found that the relative weight placed on accounting returns declines with the importance of growth opportunities. Bushman et al. (1998a) found that, while the weight placed on earnings in determining cash compensation has not declined over time, the importance of earnings relative to other information captured by stock returns has declined over time. Bushman et al. (1998b) found that changes in payearnings sensitivities are positively associated with changes in price-earnings sensitivities (earnings response coefficients) and the noise in market returns and negatively associated with the noise in earnings and the market-to-book ratio (a proxy for growth opportunities).
Investigations of relative performance evaluation (RPE) with respect to market and accounting performance measures have produced mixed results. Antle and Smith found evidence of RPE with respect to accounting returns for 16 out of 39 firms in their sample and find weaker evidence of RPE for market returns. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Janakiraman, Lambert and Larcker (1992) found evidence of RPE with respect to market returns but not for accounting returns.
Very few studies have examined relations between total compensation or non-cash components of compensation and firm performance measures. 3 In a study that examined relations between pay and market returns, Murphy (1985) found significant positive relations between the change in total compensation and stock returns and between the change in cash compensation and stock returns, but he found no relationship between the change in stock-based compensation and stock returns. Baber et al.
found significantly positive coefficients on market return in their total pay, cash (salary and bonus), and long-term pay (options, restricted stock and LTIP pay-outs) equations, but they found a significantly positive coefficient on accounting return in their cash equation only.
Total compensation and compensation mix
The agency theoretic models that motivate empirical research in executive compensation derive total compensation as a function of available performance measures (Holmström 1982, Banker and Datar 1989) . Total compensation paid to an executive includes cash payments such as salary and bonus and other awards including grants of stock options and restricted stock. James Cathro (1996) , a principal with the international compensation consulting firm William M. Mercer, commented: "There seems to exist a public perception that option grants are made over and above what is already adequate compensation in the form of salary and bonus. This is rarely the case. Typically, today's compensation committee will establish a mix of pay that includes the estimated value of the long-term incentives as part of a total compensation package."
When compensation is paid in two or more forms, their relative mix depends on factors that influence the marginal costs and benefits to the firm and the marginal utility to the employee (Woodbury 1983 In structuring an executive's compensation package, pay components may be substituted for each other. Since different components have different risk and incentive profiles, the mix of pay components may influence the level of an executive's total pay. Relative to cash bonus, stock-based pay provides continuing performance incentives and imposes additional (future) risk on employees (see Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia 1991) . Therefore, substitution between cash bonus pay and stock-based awards cannot be assumed to take place on a dollar-for-dollar basis. We examine whether cash bonus pay and stock-based pay are substituted for each other and whether executives are paid a premium to substitute stock-based pay for cash bonus pay.
Hypothesis 2a: Cash bonus pay and stock-based pay are substituted for each other. Hypothesis 2b: Executives are paid a premium to substitute stock-based pay for cash bonus pay.
Since the need to offer incentives in the compensation contract decreases with the level of an executive's stock and option holdings (Jensen and Murphy 1990) , we test whether the cash bonus and stock-based shares of total pay decrease with the executive's stock and option holdings.
Hypothesis 3: The cash bonus and stock-based shares of total pay decrease with executives' holdings of shares and options.
Time-series relations between pay and performance Murphy (1985) observed that cross-sectional differences in characteristics of firms and their executives are likely to influence relations between compensation and performance. Failure to control (including option and restricted stock awards). Our results remain robust to the consideration of separate categories for these factors would cause an omitted variable problem and lead to biased estimates in empirical models that relate compensation levels to performance. He controlled for this problem by using a firstdifference specification of the compensation variable, reasoning that the lagged compensation values would be informative about the characteristics of the firm and the executive. Lambert and Larcker (1987) used a first difference specification based on theoretical multi-period agency models with memory (Lambert 1983 , Rogerson 1985 . In these models, changes in compensation are related to surprises in performance. Lambert and Larcker used the level of RET (since there is almost no serial correlation in market returns) and the change in ROE (return on equity) as variables that measure surprises in performance. Other researchers have adopted similar specifications, relying on these empirical and theoretical arguments (Ely 1991 , Sloan 1993 , Baber et al. 1996 , Bushman et al. 1998a ). Boschen and Smith (1995) suggested that the first difference specification of the compensation variable may be overly restrictive because it assumes that changes in compensation persist over time.
They contrasted the implications of the ex-post settling up model (Fama 1980, Gibbons and Murphy 1992) with the implications of the multi-period agency model (Lambert 1983 , Rogerson 1985 . While the ex-post settling up model implies that there is a dynamic response of pay to surprises in performance, it does not imply a permanent change in pay except under the assumption that the manager's true productivity evolves as a random walk. On the other hand, the basic multi-period agency specification implies that changes in pay are persistent because it treats the employment contract as a mechanism for smoothing consumption across periods. Boschen and Smith observed that the two models are not mutually exclusive and that the permanence of the pay response to performance is an empirical issue.
They found that there is significant decay over time in the compensation response to an observed stock return, dampening out after four periods.
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Hypothesis 4: Compensation responses to performance shocks are not persistent.
without such partial aggregation.
The change in accounting return (∆ROE or ∆ROA) has been used as an empirical proxy for the surprise component of accounting performance (Lambert and Larcker 1987 , Gibbons and Murphy 1990 , Ely 1991 , Janakirman, Lambert, and Larcker 1992 , Sloan 1993 . This specification implicitly assumes that the expected accounting return is equal to the accounting return in the previous period, which would be appropriate if the time-series of accounting returns were a random walk. Bushman et al. (1998b) found that compensation sensitivity to earnings depends, among other things, on the persistence of earnings (which is loosely defined as the extent to which a current period earnings innovation extends into future periods). This suggests that the earnings time-series is not interpreted as a random walk (innovations in earnings are not considered to be permanent) in the evaluation of executive performance.
Hypothesis 5: The accounting time-series is not treated as a random walk.

Reciprocal relations between incentive compensation and performance
Reciprocal relations between pay and performance are fundamental to agency theory. In the moral hazard model of agency (Holmström 1979) , where the agent's actions are not directly observable, expected performance increases with the performance-sensitivity of pay because the agent is motivated to exert higher effort. In the self-selection model (Freeman 1977, Harris and Holmström 1982) , where the agent's ability is unobservable, expected performance increases with the performance-sensitivity of pay because more talented agents accept contracts with greater performance-sensitivity. In both of these models, the variable components of pay increase with observed performance by design. Furthermore, the expected cost of a compensation system increases as it becomes more performance-based because the agents must be compensated for accepting additional risk (Abowd 1990) .
A few empirical studies have considered reciprocal relations between pay and performance.
Abowd specified a simultaneous equations model that included measures of performance-sensitivity in year t and performance in year t+1 as endogenous variables. For ROA, he found that t+1 performance increased with the sensitivity of compensation to performance in t. His results were not as strong for RET. Boschen and Smith (1995) specified a simultaneous equations model that included contemporaneous measures of compensation and market performance (RET) as endogenous variables.
For cash compensation and total compensation, they found that compensation is significantly and positively related to RET and that RET is significantly and positively related to compensation.
In the specification of our model, contemporaneous measures of the cash bonus and stock-based shares of total compensation, market returns, and accounting returns are included as endogenous variables. To test for reciprocal relations between pay and performance, the return variables are included in the compensation share equations and the compensation shares are included in the return equations.
Since, at the outset, we do not know whether both the cash bonus share and stock-based share vary positively with firm performance, our tests of reciprocal relations are necessarily joint tests of the variability of the pay components with performance and of performance with the variable proportion of total pay.
If either or both of the cash bonus share and stock-based share varies or vary positively with performance, it or they may be used as a measure or measures of the proportion of total pay that is variable. Under the moral hazard (hidden effort) model, expected performance increases with the proportion of pay that is variable because a higher proportion of variable pay gives executives a greater incentive to work harder. Under the self-selection (hidden ability) model, expected performance increases with the proportion of pay that is variable because contracts with a higher proportion of variable pay attract executives with greater ability.
Hypothesis 6a: Market and accounting performance increase with the variable shares of total compensation.
The agency arguments may also be applied to executives' holdings. Firms may exert influence over executives' holdings by substituting stock-based pay for cash pay or by giving executives opportunities to purchase shares at a discount. Under the moral hazard model, executives with greater holdings would apply greater effort. Under the self-selection model, better executives would be attracted to firms that provide greater ownership opportunities, ceteris paribus. 
Empirical model of total pay
To test our hypotheses, we specify an empirical model that relates total pay to performance through the cash bonus and stock-based shares of total pay. The model permits substitution between the pay components, relaxes restrictive time-series assumptions about the pay response to performance shocks and the treatment of accounting returns in compensation contracts, and accommodates reciprocal relations between pay and performance.
The compensation equations
To assist in the interpretation of the results and to control for non-linearities, we use the log of total pay (LOGTOTALPAY) as our total compensation variable (Murphy 1985 , Sloan 1993 . We consider total compensation to be made up of fixed payments (salary, other annual and all other compensation), cash bonus payments (bonus and long-term incentive plan pay-outs) and stock-based payments (options and restricted stock awards). We nominally refer to these categories as salary, bonus, and stock-based pay and we include the bonus share (BONUSSHARE) and stock-based share (STOCKSHARE) of total compensation as independent variables in the LOGTOTALPAY equation and as dependent variables in separate equations. The salary share is implicitly included in the LOGTOTALPAY equation since the three components add to one. To enable the cash bonus and stockbased shares of total pay to vary with firm performance (hypothesis 1a), we include RET and ROA in the BONUSSHARE and STOCKSHARE equations. In this specification, the performance variables will influence total pay through the BONUSSHARE and STOCKSHARE in the LOGTOTALPAY equation.
To test for relative performance evaluation (hypothesis 1b), we include industry average returns for the four-digit SIC industry (INDUSTRYRET and INDUSTRYROA) as independent variables in the BONUSSHARE and STOCKSHARE equations.
To permit substitution between bonus pay and stock-based pay (hypothesis 2a), we include BONUSSHARE in the STOCKSHARE equation and STOCKSHARE in the BONUSSHARE equation.
If substitution occurs, the signs should be negative on the coefficients of these variables. If managers are paid a premium to substitute stock-based pay for cash bonus (hypothesis 2b), the magnitude of the coefficient on BONUSSHARE in the STOCKSHARE equation should be greater than one and the magnitude of the coefficient on STOCKSHARE in the BONUSSHARE equation should be less than one.
To test whether the pay components decrease with managers' stock and option holdings include the state income tax rate (TAXRATE) as an independent variable in the total compensation equation. 7 Previous research documents greater use of stock-based pay for firms with more extensive growth opportunities in their investment opportunity set (Smith and Watts 1992 , Gaver and Gaver 1996 , Baber, Janakiraman and Kang 1996 . Therefore, we include sales growth (SALESGROWTH) and the book to market ratio (BOOKTOMARKET) in the STOCKSHARE equation. While the market to book ratio is considered to be a proxy for growth options (Smith and Watts 1992) , we use the inverse of this ratio to avoid empirical problems with sample observations that have negative book values.
The variability of performance, precision of performance measurement and capital structure of the firm may influence the agency-based relations between pay and performance. Stock return volatility is associated with both the variability of firm performance (risk) and the noise in stock returns (inverse of precision). Since the cost to the firm of using incentive pay increases with risk and the relative emphasis on accounting and market returns may be influenced by the noise in stock returns, we include stock return volatility (STOCKVOLATILITY) in both the compensation share equations. The debt to equity ratio is associated with the agency conflict between stockholders and debtholders. Stockholders prefer more risky projects, vis-a-vis debtholders, because stockholders effectively have a call option on the firm at the value of the debt. John and John (1993) observed that reducing the variability of executive pay 7 We assume that the executive lives in the state where the company's headquarters are located and acknowledge that some executives may work in one state and live in another. The state tax rate is used to measure differences in the (thereby reducing managers' incentives to favor more risky projects) might reduce the cost of borrowing. Garvey and Mawani (1999) observed that stock options unravel the equity incentive to take risky projects. Therefore, we include the debt to assets ratio (DEBTTOASSETS) in the bonus share equation. 
The Data
Our sample is drawn from the ExecuComp data for the years 1992-1997. This data includes information on executives at 1836 firms included in the S&P 500, mid-cap and small-cap indices during this period. Firms are in 343 four-digit and 62 two-digit SIC industry codes and are not strongly concentrated in any particular industry. We use all of the firms in the data set except for regulated companies. Descriptions of the variables used in the analysis are provided in table 1.
While the ExecuComp data set provides a large cross-section of firms, it does not provide a sufficiently long time series to enable estimation on a firm by firm basis (Lambert and Larcker 1987) .
Therefore, our estimations are pooled (as in Sloan 1993 and Smith 1998a) . Table 2 provides information about each component as a percentage of total compensation. The data reveals that the salary portion of total pay is declining while the option portion of total pay is increasing.
The ExecuComp data includes information for all executives reported in the proxy statements.
SEC rules require companies to include compensation data for the CEO and the four other highest-paid executives. To avoid problems with cross-sectional correlation and to reduce the impact of observations for executives who are employed for part of the year and included in the proxy disclosure, we average across executives for each firm-year. Of a total number of firm-years of 8937 in the data set, 556 observations were not used because compensation data were missing, 2,251 observations were used to provide lagged values, and 1,946 were not used because values of the exogenous variables were missing.
After eliminating 30 influential observations, the model was estimated with 4,154 observations.
Estimation and Results
To accommodate substitution between the compensation components and reciprocity between pay and performance, the system of equations is estimated using three-stage least squares (Zellner and Theil 1962) . Identification of the model and of every equation in the model is checked using the rank and order conditions (Judge et al. 1988) . This would seem to indicate that BONUSSHARE is influenced by performance but STOCKSHARE is not. The results of the estimation show that this is not true.
Since the sample is a pooled cross-section with up to five observations for each firm, we tested for the presence of serial correlation. Our tests revealed that the absolute values of the serial correlation coefficients were less than 0.10 for all equations except the LOGTOTALPAY equation where the coefficient was 0.12. These values indicated that no adjustment for serial correlation was necessary. We identified influential observations using recommended cutoffs for leverage points, Studentized residuals, the DFFITS measure, and standard influences of observations on the covariance of estimates (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 1980, Krasker, Kuh and Welsch 1983 
Tests of hypotheses
With respect to hypothesis 1a (that the pay components increase with market and accounting based performance measures), BONUSSHARE and STOCKSHARE (table 4b) ?? and ??? respectively) . This indicates that the accounting return series is not treated as random walk in the design of compensation contracts. As discussed above, the strong negative coefficients on the lagged industry ROA suggests that companies use previous firm and industry information in setting performance targets for the current period.
Turning to the performance equations (table 4c) 9 Our specification of the simultaneity between pay and performance differs from the Boschen and Smith specification in the sense that we use the BONUSSHARE and STOCKSHARE as intervening variables between performance and total compensation whereas Boschen and Smith directly relate performance and total compensation.
In an alternative specification, we included LOGTOTALPAY (and its lagged value) instead of BONUSSHARE and STOCKSHARE in the RET and ROA equations. The coefficient on the LOGTOTALPAY was significantly positive (and the coefficient on the lagged value of LOGTOTALPAY was significantly negative) consistent with the Boschen and Smith findings. However, if both the LOGTOTALPAY and compensation share variables are included in the RET and ROA equations, the sign on LOGTOTALPAY reverses. We attribute this reversal to collinearity between In summary, the results of the tests of hypotheses 1a and 1b support the variability of both cash bonus and stock-based pay with market and accounting performance. Market performance is evaluated relative to contemporaneous industry returns and accounting performance is evaluated relative to previous firm and industry returns. The stock-based share of total compensation is more responsive to market returns, relative to accounting returns, than the cash bonus share. Tests of hypotheses 2a and 2b support substitution between cash bonus and stock-based pay (with a premium paid to managers for We checked the robustness of the results to a number of alternative specifications. We estimated the five-equation model separately for each year. We re-estimated the model with ROE as the accounting performance measure and with "accounting earnings / beginning market value of equity", used in Bushman et al. (1998a) , as the accounting performance measure. Results were qualitatively similar in all cases. Finally, we added a variety of combinations of additional control variables (such as executive age, years credited to retirement for the executive, executive turnover, research and development expense, and dividend pay-out) and found that the main results were robust to these changes.
Single-equation models
For comparison purposes, we estimated single-equation, first-difference models of total pay and the components of total pay. Our analysis indicates that these models are misspecified because they do not permit substitution between the variable pay components, allow for decay in the compensation response to performance shocks or in the impact of past accounting performance on expectations of current accounting performance, or accommodate reciprocal relations between pay and performance.
The discussion in this section is intended to illustrate how the different specifications may affect empirical inferences. 
Conclusion
This study provides information that may be applied to agency-based analyses of relations between compensation and observable firm performance measures. It illustrates the importance of considering the interplay between the components of total compensation when examining the roles of market and accounting returns in compensation contracting. While previous research has not found strong links between stock-based awards and firm performance, results obtained from the present analysis provide clear evidence that stock-based awards are sensitive to firm performance.
Although cash bonus pay and stock-based awards are positively related to both market and accounting returns, the relative influence of market returns in relation to accounting returns differs across the two compensation types. The relative weight placed on market returns (with respect to accounting returns) is much higher on stock-based awards than on cash bonus pay. This suggests that companies use stock options and restricted stock more aggressively as rewards for market based performance. Future studies that evaluate the relative weights placed on market and accounting returns should consider their effects on both cash and non-cash components.
Some important specification issues are illustrated by the analysis. Examination of the components of total compensation must consider substitution between cash and stock-based awards.
Using first difference specifications of the compensation and accounting return variables place restrictions on the analysis. These restrictions may be relaxed, while retaining the information contained in the lagged values, by using level-lag specifications. Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence support reciprocal relations between pay and performance. Analysis of one side of these relations may produce biased results.
Our evidence indicates that cash bonus pay and stock-based awards are substituted for each other and executives are paid a premium to substitute stock-based awards for cash bonus pay. Current firm performance is more sensitive to cash bonus pay than to stock-based awards. On the other hand, stockbased awards have continuing performance effects through stock and option holdings. In addition, total compensation, current bonus and stock-based awards are reduced for stock and option holdings. These observations are consistent with agency hypotheses based on the different risk and incentive profiles of the compensation types. 
